Putin's Visit to Mongolia

Whispers of a potential fifth visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Mongolia for the 85th anniversary of the Khalkhyn Gol victory in September 2024, are swirling through the media. While such an event would carry symbolic weight for both nations, its likelihood remains shrouded in uncertainty, reflecting the complex geopolitical currents buffeting both countries.

Putin's last visit to Mongolia, commemorating the 80th anniversary in 2019, occurred in a vastly different world. At present, with Russia heavily engaged in Ukraine and facing international criticism, a visit would lead to significant consequences for both sides.

For Mongolia, hosting Putin would be a public relations challenge, potentially damaging relations with Western partners, particularly the US, a key player in its “third neighbor” policy. This policy aims to reduce Ulaanbaatar’s reliance on its two powerful neighbors, a strategy increasingly vital as great power competition intensifies.

However, to dismiss the possibility of a Putin visit outright would be premature. Putin, facing increasing international isolation, might see a visit to Mongolia as an opportunity to demonstrate that he still has friends on the world stage. For a leader who thrives on projecting an image of strength and defiance, the symbolism of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Mongolia on the anniversary of a shared victory against a common enemy could hold undeniable appeal.

This dynamic works both ways. For ambitious Mongolian leaders, eager to secure their own legacy and burnish their nationalist credentials, a high-profile meeting with Putin holds undeniable allure. A photo-op with the Russian leader, particularly on such a symbolically charged occasion, could translate into enhanced domestic legitimacy and a potent image of being a leader who commands respect on the world stage.

Of course, the Kremlin is also aware of Mongolia's strategic importance as a resource-rich buffer state bordering both Russia and China. Maintaining influence and countering pro-Western sentiment, particularly among followers of former President Elbegdorj, are key objectives for Moscow. These goals can be pursued through more discreet diplomatic channels and economic incentives, as evidenced by the upcoming visit of Belarusian President Lukashenko, widely seen as a stand-in for his patron, Putin. Yet, a personal appearance by Putin himself would undoubtedly send a far more potent signal, both to Mongolia and the wider world.

Mongolia, for its part, faces a familiar dilemma: how to benefit from its giant neighbor's economic largesse without becoming a vassal state. Russia remains a critical energy supplier, fueling concerns about potential blackmail. Ulaanbaatar is eager to address the trade imbalance, seeking access for its meat and agricultural products to the vast Russian market. Yet, Moscow shrewdly links trade concessions to Mongolia joining the Eurasian Economic Union, a move that would bind Ulaanbaatar closer to Moscow's orbit, potentially alienating Western partners.

Adding to Mongolia’s strategic anxieties is the uncertain future of Russia itself. A protracted war in Ukraine, coupled with the bite of Western sanctions, could lead to Russia increasingly reliant on China, further tilting the regional balance of power and potentially limiting Mongolia’s own maneuvering room.

Whether Putin ultimately visits to Mongolia remains an open question. However, the very fact that it is being seriously considered underscores the difficult balancing act facing Ulaanbaatar. Caught between the interests of powerful neighbors, the allure of a grand spectacle with Putin, and the need to maintain its hard-won independence, Mongolia must tread carefully, leveraging its unique position to secure a future free from domination by any single power.

The Battles of Khalkhin Gol, also known as the Nomonhan Incident in Japan, were the critical conflicts during the Soviet–Japanese border disputes in 1939, involving the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Japan, and Manchukuo. The engagements were named after the Khalkhin Gol River where they took place, while in Japan, the main battle is referred to as the Nomonhan Incident, named after the nearby village of Nomonhan on the Mongolia-Manchuria border.

Although not well-known in the West, this engagement played a significant role in shaping Japanese actions during World War II. The battle caused dissatisfaction among officials in Tokyo towards the Kwantung Army, not so much because of the defeat itself, but due to the fact that it was started and escalated without direct approval from the Japanese government. This defeat, coupled with the resistance from the Chinese in the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (which undermined the Army's war strategy against the USSR), led the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo to move away from the Army's preferred North Strike Group policy, which aimed to capture Siberia up to Lake Baikal.