Steppe by Steppe: Mongolia Courts Central Asia for Strategic Leverage

Mongolia’s pivot toward its western neighbourhood is significant. It marks a deliberate shift from reactive diplomacy toward shaping new alignments.

Mongolia has long lived with a unique form of claustrophobia: it is not merely landlocked, but entirely boxed in by two assertive giants—Russia and China. That geo-economic encirclement has made trade diversification not just a development goal, but a geopolitical imperative.

Now, a flurry of presidential visits from Central Asia, including from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in June 2025, has sparked talk of a westward turn. The diplomatic choreography is deliberate. So is the message: Mongolia wants options.

At first glance, the results are modest. Trade with Uzbekistan has surged in percentage terms, but from a trivial base—just $20 million last year. Turkmenistan’s engagement appears largely ornamental. Infrastructure remains patchy across the region. And geography is stubborn: without a direct rail link, Mongolia must route goods through China or Russia to reach its Central Asian “cousins.” The newly touted China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) corridor, for instance, bypasses Mongolia altogether.

China’s expanding footprint in Central Asia sharpens this urgency. As Russian influence fades under the weight of its war in Ukraine, Beijing is stepping into the vacuum. President Xi Jinping recently signed a treaty of “permanent good-neighbourliness” with the five Central Asian states as trade between China and the region hit record highs. As China binds the region tighter into its logistical and economic web, Ulaanbaatar’s outreach looks less like a side project and more like a geopolitical hedge and an effort to ensure it isn’t left isolated in a new regional configuration.

Yet focusing only on trade volumes or missed infrastructure deals misses the deeper logic of Mongolia’s pivot. It is a high strategy wrapped in soft power, and crucially a form of political statecraft. As parliament wrangles and the prime minister battles domestic discontent, the presidency is projecting competence abroad. The symbolism of new embassies, direct flights (e.g. UB-Tashkent), and high-level summits are not incidental. It offers a ready-made narrative of leadership, forward vision, and strategic autonomy, particularly foreign policy remains one of the few arenas directed from the top.

This Central Asian opening is also just one prong of a larger balancing act. Mongolia is deepening ties with its neighbours, completing the Gashuunsukhait–Gantsmod railway with China, extending yuan swaps, and moving forward with a free trade deal with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. But those relationships come with baggage. In contrast, Central Asia offers familiarity without overreach. Shared histories, post-socialist transitions, and landlocked struggles give the relationship texture and narrative coherence. It is a partnership of peers, not patrons.

Still, constraints abound. Mongolia’s fiscal position is fragile. Export revenues are falling. The state cannot finance the costly transport links required to turn goodwill into goods flow. This makes the country highly reliant on external capital and leaves many of the 20 or so deals signed with Uzbekistan in the realm of paper promises. Private sector interest is growing but much will depend on whether financing, logistics and regulatory harmonisation follow.

Even when complementarities exist, such as Uzbekistan helping to process Mongolian copper and Mongolia exporting meat and wool, the two still compete in overlapping markets. Both countries want to sell similar industrial commodities. And while symbolism matters, there are risks in mistaking ceremony for substance.

So what might success look like? Mongolia’s recent uranium deal with France’s Orano offers a useful benchmark: a technically complex, strategically valuable partnership with real economic and political dividends. Similar, if more modest, gains could emerge from logistics or mineral processing ventures with Central Asian partners, but only if those projects secure serious financial and political commitment.

Mongolia’s pivot toward its western neighbourhood is significant. It marks a deliberate shift from reactive diplomacy toward shaping new alignments—before others do the shaping. If Mongolia’s outreach builds a base of cultural affinity, institutional familiarity and occasional commercial wins, it will have succeeded in doing something rare: turning symbolism into statecraft, and soft power into strategic depth.