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Mongolia’s Rosneft Deal Faces Scrutiny

  • Writer: Amar Adiya
    Amar Adiya
  • Apr 24, 2025
  • 2 min read

A proposed 20-year jet fuel supply deal between Mongolia and Russia’s state-owned Rosneft is drawing sharp criticism and rekindling concerns over strategic dependence.

Currently under parliamentary review, the agreement would establish a joint venture to supply around 70,000 tons of jet fuel annually to Chinggis Khaan International Airport—Mongolia’s only major international air hub and a cornerstone of its tourism ambitions.


Mongolia rosneft

Supporters argue the deal ensures fuel security for the airport while Mongolia races to complete its long-delayed oil refinery in Dornogovi.

But critics, including some members of the Democratic Party, see a deeper problem: the entrenchment of Mongolia’s reliance on Russia at a time when energy diversification should be a national priority.

Despite modest domestic crude production, Mongolia imports nearly all refined fuel from Russia. This leaves the country acutely vulnerable to supply shocks and price manipulation. Although alternative suppliers like China and South Korea exist, their fuel comes at a premium, and logistical infrastructure remains underdeveloped. The Dornogovi refinery, plagued by delays and cost overruns, remains the government’s best hope for long-term energy autonomy.

Critics worry the Rosneft agreement could undermine this project’s viability before it becomes operational. Guaranteed Russian supply risks crowding out domestic capacity and deterring private investment. Worse, a long-term arrangement may displace Mongolian fuel importers, consolidating market share under a state-backed Russian entity and raising the spectre of monopolistic pricing power.

This is not a narrow commercial dispute. It fits into a broader pattern of creeping Russian influence in Mongolia’s strategic sectors. While Deputy Prime Minister Gantumur has promoted trade liberalisation and economic partnership with Russia, the Rosneft deal would deepen entanglement with a bloc dominated by Moscow, limiting Ulaanbaatar’s room for manoeuvre.

The timing is also notable. Talks between China and Russia on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline—set to transit through Mongolia—appear to be reviving. If built, the pipeline would further bind Mongolia into a Russia-China energy axis, reducing its leverage with both neighbours. Yet the pipeline’s future remains uncertain, shaped by fluctuating global gas prices and Beijing’s evolving energy calculus.

Against this backdrop, parliament faces a consequential decision. Approving the Rosneft deal may bring short-term supply stability, but at the cost of delaying energy self-sufficiency and constraining future policy choices. Rejecting it risks disruption at a critical national infrastructure site, but may create momentum to fast-track refinery completion and attract alternative suppliers.

Rather than choosing between security and sovereignty, Mongolia’s lawmakers must insist on clarity. The Rosneft deal’s terms—pricing formulas, dispute resolution, market access provisions—must be made more mutually beneficial. Any joint venture should include sunset clauses and safeguards to prevent market distortion. Most importantly, the government must recommit to refinery completion with transparent milestones and enforceable deadlines.

Energy security cannot be outsourced. Without domestic refining capacity and competitive supply routes, Mongolia will remain hostage to regional power politics. The Rosneft deal should be treated not as a lifeline, but as a warning.

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